Far from being inevitable, Hitler's success was, to a large degree, due to luck, and an even larger degree to the ill judjement of his pollitical foes. In 1932 the Nazis had lost some 15% of its popular support, mostly to the DNVP and the KPD. Internal criticism was mounting, finances were so bad that a Thuringia Newspaper was reported saying "Due to the difficult financial situation the NSDAP is in, the light at the end of the tunnel will be turned off until further notice." These events merely heightened tensions inside the party.
Other setbacks followed. Firstly, there was the repetitive refusal of President Von Hindenburg to consider Hitler for the Chancellery. Hitler's obscenity in demanding the chancellorship had also had affected talks with the person who eventually was to replace Von Papen as Chancellor, Von Schleicher. This also caused another blow for the Nazi party. Von Schleicher, who did not wish to compromise with Hitler, set about doing a deal with Hitler's number two man, Gregor Strasser, who had the highest respect among the moderate parties, and was seen by them as the main potential partner in a collation. This was a clever attempt by Von Schleicher to split the Nazi movement. The result ended with Strasser resigning from the Nazi party on December the eighth and unleashing a wave of anxiety and fear.
Given the state the Nazi party was in at the start of 1934, few people noticed the stopover made in Cologne on his way to a rally at Detmould on January the 4th. Hitler rented a car and drove to the house of Kurt Freherr Von Schroder, a Nazi sympathiser, where upon he met with the ex-Chancellor Von Papen. Industrialists wished the ministry to be left to the Nazis, as the crumbling Nazi support would most likely help the KPD. A newspaper photographer, who had taken up a position nearby, photographed their arrival. As Von Schleicher wished to broaden the base of the government as far as the Social democratic trade unions, he quickly lost the support of heavy industry and agriculture that Von Papen had enjoyed as chancellor.
Von Papen
The talks at Von Schroder's started by trying to deal with past conflicts. After the events of the 13th of August, and the conviction of Potempa killers on the 22nd of August, the Nazis had attacked Von Papen at every opportunity they could. Hitler's expressing his rage, came back to these events while Von Papen attempted to pacify him. Von Papen, claiming innocence, blamed Von Schleicher for the events of the 13th of August. In an attempt to gain Hitler's Trust, Von Papen then told him of Schleicher's hand in connection with his own dismissal from the chancellorship, and how irritated President Von Hindenburg had been by Von Schleicher. He also informed Hitler of "the methods with which it is possible to become Chancellor these days." This Hitler already knew, but was re-enforced by Von Papen. Von Papen did not do this out of the goodness of his heart, he wanted Von Schleicher politically destroyed and to get back into power, the rest of the talks went automatically, and Von Papen indicated to Hitler that if he was given a high position within the new government, Von Papen would use his still considerable influence over the President, an ageing Hindenburg.
The meeting, which lasted just under four hours, was supposed to be secret, so the following day when the Berlin Tagliche Rundschau newspaper printed the news of the meeting with photographic proof, it had the effect of forcing Hitler, Von Papen and Schroder to play the incident down. The press began to speculate as to whether or not this was evidence of a forming allignence against Schleicher, or a noncommittal exchange of views.
At approximately the same time Hitler and Von Paper's meeting was ending, a new one was starting. In attendance was President Von Hindenburg, Strasser and the Chancellor Schleicher. Schleicher still had envisioned gaining, with Strasser's help, the support of parts of the right wing for his government. This hope persisted, despite the fact that Strasser had resigned from the Nazi party and he had retreated to South Tyrol. Neither had Strasser attempted to start any active opposition movement within the party, giving Hitler time to reconcile the party.
Hitler's refusal to cooperate with Schleicher and his cabinet led to a deterioration of his position. Most of all, Schleicher had been unable to stop the president from including Von Papen in his inner circle of advisors. After Schleicher gained unrefuteable proof of the secret meeting between Hitler and Von Papen, he complained to President Von Hindenburg. On the 9th of January Von Papen gave Schleicher an account of the meeting between him and Hitler, then, directly against Schleicher's wishes, he went over to the president and explained it to him. Von Papen was pleased to learn that Hindenburg in no way objected.
For the last six months, Hitler had gained another intermediary with Von Papen in Berlin. This was Joachim Von Ribbentrop, an importer with overseas experience. Ribbentrop's weekend cottage was to become the focus of political negotiations. According to Ribbentrop's notes, Von Papen and Hitler met again at his house on the night of 10-11 January, less than a week after their Cologne talks. Hitler returned to Berlin on the evening of 17 January to hold a meeting with Hugenberg later that night. But the atmosphere between the DNVP leader and him remained frosty. A further meeting between Von Papen and the Hitler took place on the following day at Ribbentrop's house in the presence of Göring, Röhm and Himmler. According to Ribbentrop's records: "Hitler insisted on chancellorship; Von Papen again thinks this impossible. It went beyond his influence with Hindenburg to get this accepted."
On January the 30th, President Von Hindenburg, under the influence of Von Papen dismissed Schleicher from the chancellery and appointed Hitler Chancellor. Hitler was head of a coalition government consisting of the Nazis and the DNVP, and Von Papen was appointed Vice-chancellor. Hitler, although he was Chancellor wanted more power, the president could still dismiss him, he did not hold a parliamentary majority, there were only three Nazi ministers and he would have to abide by the German constitution.
The first thing Hitler did was to call an election in an attempt to gain a majority in the Reichstag. He used the police and the SA to frighten his political opponents. On the 27th of February, just before the elections, the Reichstag burnt down. When a communist was caught inside the burning building, the Nazis took advantage of it to blame the communists. He used this to force the president to order an emergency decree and arrest communists. Hitler did not ban the KPD yet, as he wanted it to detract from the votes of the other left wing parties. The Nazis won 288 seats.
On March 23, the Reichstag met to consider passing the Enabling act (Officially called the 'Law for Removing the Distress of the People and the Reich') If passed it would effectively establish Hitler's legal dictatorship. That day the SA gathered around the assembly chanting "We want the Bill or else. We want the Bill, or fire and murder." To pass this law, the German constitution would have to be changed, to change the German constitution Hitler needed a 2/3 majority, or 31 non-Nazi votes. Hitler got these votes by making a deal with the Center party, if they would support him, he would make sure that their interests would be served. He also promised that the powers from the Enabling act would only be temporary. Hitler got the votes, declared all political parties except the Nazi Party illegal and went to a one party election. Hitler came to power, not only through his own skills, but also through the weaknesses of other people and institutions.